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                   Research Methodology in Neurofeedback
                
                  A couple 
                    of recent scientific papers on the placebo effect reached the popular 
                    media, and prompt us to revisit the whole issue of how research might 
                    be done to everyone's satisfaction in neurofeedback. The first of 
                    these articles was a review of some 47 studies of anti-depressants 
                    that had been submitted to the FDA to gain approval for anti-depressant 
                    medications. In more than half of those studies, the drugs did no 
                    better than placebo. And overall, the improvement with drugs was only 
                    18% greater than it was with placebos. The second of these studies 
                    involved functional imagery of drug responders, placebo responders, 
                    and non-responders. It found that placebo responders also showed changes 
                    in their functional imagery, and that these changes differed from 
                    those induced by the effective medications.  
                  These studies elevate the importance of the placebo effect once 
                    again in everyone's considerations, which can only serve to increase 
                    the burden of proof for neurofeedback. Our traditional answer to 
                    this challenge has been to point out that the placebo effect is 
                    not really on the other team as far as neurofeedback is concerned. 
                    Let me explain. From the perspective of drug interventions, the 
                    placebo is the catch-all phrase that subsumes all mechanisms other 
                    than the drug itself by which recovery may have been achieved. This 
                    includes spontaneous recovery, self-regulation-induced recovery, 
                    "the natural course of the disease" (e.g., natural waxing 
                    and waning of symptoms), and the results of changes in the psychodynamic 
                    milieu.  
                  In another recent study reviewing the placebo effect, it was shown 
                    that the majority of the benefit being ascribed to the placebo could 
                    be understood in terms of the "natural course of the disease." 
                    This is particularly true of depression, where episodes of depression 
                    are usually episodic, and recovery is achieved in time regardless 
                    of any intervention. However, this still leaves room for a "real" 
                    placebo effect of some significance. And this real placebo effect 
                    is presumably mediated by "spontaneous" or psychodynamically 
                    mediated changes in the quality of brain self-regulation. The possibility 
                    of such a self-regulation response helps to make the case for neurofeedback. 
                    It does not undermine it. Presumably the natural waxing and waning 
                    of depression and other conditions is also reflective of changes 
                    in the quality of brain self-regulation. From our perspective, then, 
                    the placebo effect, in all its manifestations, is just a stalking 
                    horse for self-regulation-mediated recovery. As such, it is our 
                    ally, and we are inclined to take umbrage at the dismissal of a 
                    real change as being "just a placebo effect."  
                  We have to take skeptics where they are, however, and the question 
                    will still be asked, what part of neurofeedback-induced recovery 
                    is ascribable to "specific" and to "non-specific" 
                    effects of the training. The best study to answer this question 
                    was Barry Sterman's serendipitously fully controlled, fully blinded 
                    cat study with the monomethylhydrazine. However, if we have to answer 
                    this same question with regard to each of the conditions we work 
                    with, what are we to do? 
                  The traditional answer has been to compare the active treatment 
                    with sham treatment, or to do reversal designs. Reversal designs 
                    are no longer ethically permitted (we are not allowed to make people 
                    worse), and even placebo designs have their ethical problems. But 
                    let's pursue the idea of sham-training a little further. It is extraordinarily 
                    difficult to do well. When Sterman did it, he acknowledged that 
                    trainees in fact discovered the subterfuge (no surprise). So the 
                    blind was broken, and the whole objective of doing a blinded study 
                    was not met. To do sham-training well, we have to simulate everything 
                    about the person's EEG, including in particular the movement artifacts 
                    and the eye-blink artifacts. The only way to do this successfully 
                    is to work somehow with the person's actual EEG.  
                  The more difficult standard to meet is that the clinician must 
                    be just as invested in success with the placebo treatment as with 
                    the experimental treatment, so that any placebo effect may be invoked. 
                    How do we fool the clinician who is at the controls into being motivated? 
                    The obvious answer is that we must employ an active treatment that 
                    also promises some benefit, rather than a total sham treatment. 
                    Even having done this, an asymmetry prevails. The clinician knows 
                    which is the experimental design, and which is the "B" 
                    design. There will be a natural tendency to "lean" in 
                    favor of the experimental treatment. The only way for a true "equipoise" 
                    to exist with respect to two treatments is for the clinician not 
                    to know which is better, and therefore to be motivated to succeed 
                    with both.  
                  We have here devised what I think is the perfect experimental design 
                    for neurofeedback, an A/B design between two active treatments in 
                    which a fundamental doubt exists as to which is better, and outcomes 
                    are compared. In this approach, we may lose 'contrast' between treatment 
                    and sham, but we heighten our sensitivity to differential effects. 
                    We already know that it is not a big deal to demonstrate recovery 
                    from depression. What the world will take notice of is differential 
                    effects of specific treatment protocols.  
                  Now I will point out that in our clinical work, with our generic 
                    protocols, we have in fact been working with this research design 
                    all along. Essentially all of our training protocols come in pairs, 
                    and are used as necessary to balance each other. The original training 
                    on the midline at Cz bifurcated for us into left- and right-hemisphere 
                    specificity of "C3beta" and "C4SMR" training. 
                    The more recent "C3-C4" training is bifurcating for us 
                    into a combination of F3-F4 and P3-P4. Higher-frequency training 
                    is complemented by lower-frequency training, etc. Each new client 
                    faces the clinician with fundamental ambiguities about protocols 
                    that are only resolved on the basis of the differential effects 
                    of each protocol.  
                  An analogy that comes to mind is the optometrist who refines his 
                    choice of optical correction by means of A/B comparisons. This approach 
                    allows much greater refinement than the single-ended approach of 
                    "can you read this?" Eventually the optometrist reaches 
                    the point where the person can no longer tell which is better. Clinicians 
                    using our approach likewise do not settle down to a single protocol 
                    until an equivalent resolution is obtained by an elaborate A/B comparison 
                    process. Because of the high responsiveness of the individual to 
                    specific protocols in-session, feedback is usually quick. This means 
                    that the therapist is also in a relatively fast feedback loop of 
                    typically no more than a few minutes, but lasting at most a session 
                    or two.  
                  This gives neurofeedback practitioners an enormous advantage over 
                    pharmacologists. After all, the 250 studies on Ritalin don't help 
                    to decide whether a particular child will be helped, and at what 
                    dosage. They are not much good in deciding what to do in the moment. 
                    By contrast, the neurofeedback practitioner is using best research 
                    practice with each and every client. So our answer to those who 
                    ask: "where are your controlled studies?" is that we are 
                    doing them, one subject at a time. There is almost never a time 
                    when we are not doing what would be called for in a "best-practices" 
                    controlled research design. Things can't get much better than this. 
                  Siegfried Othmer 
                    July 15, 2002 
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